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AVERTED PIPING FAILURE—EARTH DAM ON PERMEABLE FOUNDATION
Scott Newhouse
Bechtel Power Corporation
5275 Westview Drive
Frederick, MD 21703

ABSTRACT
“The dam builder has substantial control over the properties of the structure he builds, but he must take the foundation as it is
furnished by nature.” (Cedergren, 1989)
This paper presents the case of an earth dam built on a permeable foundation where seepage problems nearly caused failure of the
dam. Early during first filling, before the lake was even half full, the dam showed significant seepage. Seepage boils appeared at the
dam’s toe, indicating the onset of piping failure through the foundation. Although seepage boils indicating a failure mechanism
appeared, dam failure was averted. The paper describes the events leading to the dam’s first filling incident, the averting of failure,
and engineering for renovation.
Construction of dams on permeable soils is relatively common (often unavoidable). The typical dam site has some alluvial soil in
vicinity of the water course, soils that are usually permeable. Potential for seepage-related problems generally depends on the engineer
recognizing a permeable foundation and designing the dam accordingly. The dam’s behavior—good or bad—depends on the measures
taken to accommodate seepage, such as a foundation seepage cutoff and filter-drain protection. Higher permeability generally means
higher potential for problems at the downstream toe. This paper presents several interesting aspects of a case history
supporting/illustrating this contention:
●
Original design and construction
●
Problems and near-failure conditions encountered at first filling
●
Comparison of the dam to others with permeable foundations and evaluation of other dams where design did and did not
accommodate permeable foundation conditions
●
Engineering approach to renovation
●
Performance in service

INTRODUCTION
Lake Mailande Dam was originally built in 1994 as a
homogeneous embankment (without filter/drain protection).
Figure 1 depicts the typical cross section, taken from the
construction plans, and depicts the soil profile beneath the
dam. As shown in Fig. 1, design did not include seepage
control—neither a cutoff in the foundation nor an internal
filter/drain. The construction plans did not address foundation
treatment at all, leading to extensive questions during
construction regarding soft soils, high groundwater, and
seepage control. The dam is about 55 ft high and 1,800 ft crest
length, with 337,000 cu yd of embankment fill. The dam has
sparse rural development downstream that includes houses in
its flood path and a county road at the toe. Accordingly, it is
classified high hazard. Lake Mailande is privately owned,
used solely for recreation.
Fig. 1. Lake Mailande Dam—Typical Section and Soil Profile
Paper No. 2.28
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Initial Exploration
Exploration included only three widely spaced borings, only
one of which was close to the dam’s footprint. The other two
soil borings were in borrow areas. Initial exploration did not
include any laboratory testing, neither index nor engineering
tests. It appeared that the dam’s designer ignored the soil
conditions and designed the dam as if the foundation had
nothing to do with a successful structure. The homogeneous
design was not based on any seepage analysis or prediction of
water pressures/hydraulic gradient at the toe. Construction
commenced based on essentially no exploration or
geotechnical analysis.

mechanism is a well established one related to failure of flood
protection levees, and is more common in levees than in dams.
He points out that the mechanism is actually rare in failures of
earth dams.

Supplemental Exploration
After construction commenced, further exploration was
performed to establish the soil conditions depicted in Fig. 1.
Exploration shows:
●
Significant layers of sand in the foundation
●
Significant coefficient of hydraulic conductivity (k),
of maximum 10-3 cm/s
●
Artesian water pressure rising to near 2 ft above
ground surface

Impact of Permeable Foundation Soils on Dam
Figure 2 illustrates how a permeable foundation results in
under-seepage if the dam lacks adequate seepage control
measures. As far as the impact on dam safety of seepage into
and through the foundation, permeable soil conditions can be
interpreted to either enhance dam safety or act against it.
Permeable foundation conditions are frequently interpreted as
providing drainage, thus lowering water pressure and related
hydraulic gradient at the toe. Alternatively, permeable
foundation soil can be interpreted to effect the opposite,
making water pressure and hydraulic gradient higher at the
toe. Stability of the downstream slope is directly dependent on
these two parameters—water pressure and hydraulic gradient.
Figure 3 shows how permeable soil in the foundation can be
interpreted to act as a blanket drain, lowering hydraulic
gradient, effecting a stable slope. Figure 4 illustrates a
condition where permeable soil creates the opposite effect,
where under-seepage drives hydraulic gradient higher than the
critical value where soil erosion results, effecting a dangerous
condition at the toe.

Potential Piping Through Foundation
Figure 4 is taken from Danny McCook’s A Comprehensive
Discussion of Piping and Internal Erosion Failure
Mechanisms (McCook, 2004). This figure illustrates a
potential piping failure mechanism for conditions similar to
those at the Lake Mailande Dam (Fig. 1). Figure 4 depicts a
homogeneous embankment built on a thin surficial clay layer
overlying a sand aquifer. McCook notes that such a
Paper No. 2.28

Fig. 2. Under-seepage Through Permeable Foundation
(From USACE, 1986)

Fig. 3. Effect of Permeable Blanket Drain

(From BuRec, 1987)
Fig. 4. Potential Foundation Piping Mechanism: Heave
caused by excessive seepage pressures under surface clay
blanket. Piping of sand aquifer occurs from flow of water
through defect in clay blanket, creating sand boil at ground
surface. (From McCook, 2004)
Could the mechanism illustrated in Fig. 4 form in the Lake
Mailande Dam when the lake is filled?
Effect of Horizontal Permeability
Horizontal k will almost always exceed vertical k in any soil,
whether native in situ soil or fill soil in an embankment.
References indicate the ratio of kh:kv is a minimum of 9 or 10
(Dennis et al., 1971). Seepage analysis must account for this
ratio, as illustrated in Fig. 5. Seepage analyses and flow nets
based on kh:kv ratio of 1 only represent theoretical conditions.
2

in the BuRec figure (Fig. 6). How will the dam perform if it is
instead constructed as shown in Fig. 1?

Prediction of Seepage Line within Dam

Fig. 5. Effect of kh:kv Ratio on Seepage Line
(From US Army Corps of Engineers, 1986)

CONVENTIONAL DESIGN FOR PERMEABLE
FOUNDATIONS
In predicting the dam’s behavior, one must account for the
effect of seepage through the permeable foundation. Underseepage will affect the position of the seepage line, and thus
stability, water pressure, and hydraulic gradient at the toe. The
US Bureau of Reclamation design manual states that
"Whenever economically possible, seepage through a pervious
foundation should be cut off by a trench extending to bedrock
or other impervious stratum. This is the most positive means
of controlling the amount of seepage and ensuring that no
difficulty will be encountered by piping through the
foundation or by uplift pressures at the downstream toe."
(BuRec, 1987) As this excerpt suggests, a dam on a permeable
foundation is subject to uplift and potential piping at the toe
from under-seepage. Figure 6 (on page 4) illustrates BuRec
guidelines for construction on permeable foundations,
illustrating the use of a foundation cutoff coincident with an
internal drain.
Many dams with seepage-related problems would not have
those problems had construction included an adequate cutoff.
Cedergren (1989) cites an example of a dam with a foundation
so permeable that the reservoir could not fill. On occasions of
heavy rain when the reservoir did partially fill, the
downstream slope was subjected to such seepage pressure that
boils appeared, and it was unstable. Cedergren concluded that
the dam's problems were due to a foundation gravel layer that
could and should have been cut off in construction, directly
aligning with BuRec guidelines presented in Fig. 6.
According to the BuRec design guide, the Lake Mailande
Dam should have one of the cross sections shown in Fig. 6. If
the dam is to be built without a cutoff, as planned, the design
guide indicates its cross section should look like Section (C),
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Figure 7 illustrates a predicted line of seepage within the dam
for a full reservoir condition. The predicted line of seepage is
based on the piezometer measurements shown taken during
initial filling, at the low lake elevation shown. This predicted
seepage line was sketched using methods from Cedergren
(1989), based on the seepage line exhibited by piezometer
measurements and flow net analysis based on an assumed kh:kv
ratio of 10. The piezometer data show that head and hydraulic
gradient were increasing at the toe with increasing lake
elevation. This figure illustrates that the dam as designed, with
no foundation seepage cutoff and no internal drain to control
seepage pressure, would develop intolerable water pressure
and hydraulic gradient at the toe long before the lake reached
its design elevation. Should this predicted condition be
considered accurate? How will the seepage line develop in the
dam at higher lake elevation?

Fig. 7. Predicted Line of Seepage at Full Reservoir

FIRST FILLING—AVERTED PIPING FAILURE
“Lack of viable alternatives always encourages wishful
thinking.”—J.M. Duncan
At the time conditions in the dam were as illustrated on Fig. 7
seepage problems developed. At this time, reservoir filling had
begun, and the lake was less than 50% filled. The toe near
maximum section became saturated, a shallow slide developed
near the toe, and a seepage boil appeared, as illustrated in
Fig. 8 (on page 5). Figure 8 shows the dam at its maximum
section. At the time the boil and slide developed, a piezometer
at this location indicated head at the toe nearly 12 ft above the
ground surface.
The development of the boil indicates that excessive hydraulic
gradient developed even with the lake less than 50% full, with
a water head near 20 ft of the design 45 ft head. Conditions at
this stage clearly showed that continued filling would result in
internal erosion of soil from the foundation, and likely a soil
pipe, resulting in a breech—the condition illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 6. Seepage Control for Permeable Foundations (From Bureau of Reclamation, 1987)
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Fig. 8. Lake Mailande Dam at First Filling,
Downstream Slope and Seepage Boil at Toe
The seepage boil was covered with a fabric filter and stone
ballast to control erosion. State officials directed that the lake
be lowered to a safe level until the dam was renovated.
Lowering the lake level and covering the boils averted dam
failure by erosion/piping through the foundation. The initial
prediction that a homogeneous dam could be built on the
permeable foundation at this site was obviously wrong.
At the time the conditions depicted in Fig. 8 formed, the
design engineer interpreted the boil as a harmless spring, and
interpreted the piezometer level as an effect of consolidation
due to pressure on the ground from the embankment.
However, facts did not support these interpretations:
●
The seepage boil clearly had a cone of deposition
showing fine soil being eroded.
●
The piezometer level showed steady increase with
increasing lake elevation, not with increasing
embankment height. Excess pore pressure from
consolidation would correlate with the pressure
applied by increasing height of embankment fill and
would show dissipation over time instead of a steady
increase.

performance shows that predictions that the dam could be
renovated without a cutoff were accurate.

Fig. 9. Renovated Dam Cross Section

PROMINENT LESSONS
This case and others from the literature show that a permeable
dam foundation is rarely a benefit and is usually the opposite.
Conclusions that a permeable foundation will help the dam by
acting as a drain should always be subject to skepticism and a
heavy burden of proof.

Comparison to Other Dams
REDESIGN AND RENOVATION OF A
BRAND NEW DAM
“The ground is not vindictive.…just as it is unsympathetic
when winning, it doesn’t care at all when it loses.”—
G.S. Brierly
Figure 9 shows the typical cross section engineers developed
to renovate the dam and ensure downstream slope stability and
safety against piping. Engineers had difficulty in evaluating
the need for a foundation seepage cutoff. As shown in Fig. 9,
engineers decided that water pressure and hydraulic gradient
could be controlled with drainage works, and that a cutoff was
unnecessary. Modifications to the dam included a chimney
drain, toe and blanket drains, and relief wells drilled into the
artesian zone. The renovated dam was placed in service in
1997 and has performed well. The renovated dam’s
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The following sections describe nearby dams of similar size
and soil conditions for comparison to the Lake Mailande Dam.
Big Bay Lake Dam. Big Bay Lake Dam (see Fig. 10), near
Purvis, Miss., was built in 1991. It experienced a sunny day
failure unexpectedly in 2004. The dam is a 57 ft tall earth
embankment; the impounded reservoir was about 1,100 ac
(ASDSO, 2005). The dam was evidently built with a blanket
drain, but without a foundation seepage cutoff. The failure
mechanism is theorized to be piping through the foundation.
Not enough information on the Big Bay Lake Dam has been
published to allow comparison to Lake Mailande.
Consequently, one cannot say whether foundation soils in this
dam were more or less permeable than at Lake Mailande.
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be comprehensive. Examples of permeable foundation
conditions that create problems are easily found, where
examples of the opposite—permeable foundation soils
providing benefit—are not.

Fig. 11. Bonita Lake Dam Photo and Cross Section
Table 1. Brief Summary of Case Histories

Fig. 10. Big Bay Lake Dam Breach, Lamar County,
Mississippi
(Photos from National Weather Service, Jackson, Miss.)
Bonita Lake Dam. Bonita Lake Dam (see Fig. 11) is within 4
mi of Lake Mailande, with similar size of dam and reservoir. It
was designed and built by NRCS for municipal water supply
and flood control purposes. This dam is about 60 ft high and
1,500 ft crest length, with 380,000 cu yd of embankment fill.
Soil conditions here are similar to Lake Mailande, but there is
less thickness of alluvial sand in the foundation. Artesian
groundwater pressure was not encountered at Bonita Lake.
Bonita Lake Dam was built with the elements that the BuRec
design manual calls for—positive seepage cutoff and internal
drain, although the drain here is a vertical chimney and not a
horizontal blanket. The Bonita Lake Dam has performed
without problems related to seepage.

Dam
Cecil M
Harden
Dam,
Mansfield,
IN

Addicks
Dam,
Houston, TX

Orwell Dam,
Fergus Falls,
MN

Description
117 ft tall, 1,860 ft long.
Homogeneous dam on
permeable foundation, relief
wells installed in original
construction. 2 yr after filling
required toe drain system due
to high head at toe.
49 ft tall, 61,200 ft long.
Homogeneous dam on
stratified foundation with
permeable layers. Sand boils
appeared near toe. Soilbentonite cutoff wall
constructed through the dam.
60 ft tall, 1,400 ft long.
Homogeneous dam, 90 ft of
soil in foundation, 60 ft of
stratified glacial soils
imparting uplift at toe. Small
sand boils and excess head
developed at toe, renovated
with toe drain, stability berm,
relief wells.

Reference
ASCE, 1988

ASCE, 1988
USACE,
1986

ASCE, 1988

Other Dams in the Literature
Table 1 summarizes many other case histories found in the
literature of dams with permeable foundations. Table 1 is only
a brief summary of a portion of the literature; it is not meant to
Paper No. 2.28
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Dam
Sardis Dam,
MS

Twin Buttes
Dam, San
Angelo, TX

Power plant
storage dike,
FL

West Hill
Dam, MA

Canby Creek
Site R-1,
MN

Lake
Holiday
Dam, IL
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Description
117 ft tall, 15,300 ft long.
Foundation: thin layer of silt
and clay overlying thick
sand. Relief wells part of
original construction, clogged
after 36 yr of service,
resulting in 3 to 7 ft excess
head at toe.
Renovated by adding relief
wells.
134 ft tall, 8 mi long.
100 ft overburden soil in
foundation including
pervious soils. Cutoff wall
built only in portion of dam
near maximum section.
Seepage and saturation,
excess head developed at toe.
Additional seepage cutoff
required.
30 ft tall, 18,000 ft long.
Homogeneous embankment
of sand on sand foundation.
No foundation cutoff. Failed
by breaching—suspected
piping through foundation.
54 ft tall, 2,400 ft long.
Upstream (u/s) seepage
blanket and cutoff trench.
Foundation of glacial soil
with inter-bedded silt and
sand layer—cutoff extended
to the inter-bedded layer.
Boils and excess head
developed downstream (d/s),
requiring drainage works.
54 ft tall.
Foundation soils: surface
layer of clay underlain by
pervious soil with artesian
water pressure. Boils
appeared d/s at first filling.
Relief wells ineffective.
Retrofit toe drain, later
required cutoff wall
construction.
45 ft tall, 250 ft long.
Foundation soils 50 ft thick
with sand and gravel layers.
Dam construction included
u/s blanket, shallow trench
cutoff and d/s horizontal
blanket drain. Seepage boils
developed at toe d/s of
spillway; relief wells
installed to rehabilitate dam.

Reference
ASCE, 1988

Dam
Centennial
Narrows
Dam,
Arizona

BuRec, 1998
Washakie
(Main) Dam,
WY

ASCE, 1988
Cedergren,
1989

Quail Creek
Dike, UT

ASCE, 1988

H.B. Norton
Dam, PA

McCook,
2000
Fontenelle
Dam

Oskoorouchi,
et al, 2000

Hills Creek
Dam

Description
32 ft tall, 755 ft long.
Homogeneous dam with
shallow trench cutoff on
permeable foundation
(alluvial sand and gravel).
Flood control dam failed
when rapidly filled during
Tropical Storm Nora, Sept,
1997—internal erosion of
embankment, possibly piping
through foundation.
62 ft tall, 1,250 ft long.
Built in the 1930s,
homogeneous dam on
permeable foundation,
shallow cutoff trench 5 ft
depth. Seepage problems
encountered in glacial soils
requiring renovation work at
toe for seepage control.
78 ft tall, 1,980 ft long.
Earth dam with chimney
drain, cutoff trench excavated
into weathered rock. Dike
failed at first filling by piping
through the foundation—
attributed to joints/fractures
in the weathered rock that
were not adequately cut off
and treated.
30 ft tall, 275 ft long.
Earth dam on permeable,
fractured rock foundation,
steel core/cutoff wall through
embankment and soil
overburden to rock. Excess
water pressure measured 16
ft above ground surface at
toe.
165 ft tall, zoned earth-fill on
permeable sandstone
foundation. Seepage
problems required lowering
reservoir to prevent failure.
Foundation grout curtain
effective in treating seepage
problem.
338 ft tall, zoned
embankment—earth-fill core
and rock-fill shells. Seepage
through foundation/core
contact developed after 6 yr
of service requiring remedial
grouting program.

Reference
Benoist, 1998

France, 2002

Von Thun,
1992

Newman,
1997

USACE,
1986

USACE,
1986
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Dam
Wolf Creek
Dam, KY

Saluda Dam,
Columbia,
SC

Dalewood
Shores Dam,
Lauderdale
County, MS

Salt Fork
Dam,
Guernsey
County,
Ohio

Description
200 ft tall, combination earthfill + concrete dam on
foundation of limestone with
solution cavities. Seepage
through foundation produced
muddy flow and sinkholes
d/s some 25 yr after first
filling, requiring extensive
grouting.
200 ft tall, 8,300 ft long.
Earth-fill dam with
permeable sand and broken
rock, artesian water pressure
in the foundation. Seeps on
d/s slope required remedial
drainage measures—rock
tunnel drains and rock-fill
stability berms.
25 ft tall, 4,500 ft long.
Homogeneous earth-fill on
permeable sand foundation.
Extensive seepage d/s
threatened failure by piping
beneath principal spillway
and around outlet works.
65 ft tall, 1,800 ft long.
Earth-fill with blanket and
toe drains on permeable sand
foundation. Artesian head
and sand boils developed d/s
of the dam.
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